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This paper presents an overlapping generations 
matching model in which firms have no reliable information 
about an applicant's past employment history. Labour 
demand will then be a function of the perceived job quality 
of applicants and of the number of workers who quit and 
were fired. Workers when deciding to quit take account of 
their chances to be re-employed. This interconnection of 
hiring and quitting decisions can generate a type of sunspot 
equilibrium (here randomisations over perfect foresight 
paths) because of a quit/quality externality. However, 
even if such externalities are ignored because quitters 
have lagged or static expectations, deterministic cycles can 
occur. The results of this paper may support the view that 
the unemployed are 'stigmatised' by firms, in the sense 
that if there are fewer unemployed then they find it harder 
to get a job.
1 I would like to thank Robert Waldmann for lots of help during the whole process 























































































































































































Firms like to hire workers who they believe are productive. 
When they do not have any information about an individual's 
productivity they might turn to the market for information of the likely 
quality of the average job applicant. Hiring, when an individual's 
characteristics are known, has received much attention (see for 
example Waldman [1984], Greenwald [1986] and Gibbons and Katz 
[1991]). Gibbons and Katz for example assume that workers can be 
distinguished by the reason they are in the unemployment pool, e.g. 
plant closure or lay off. Firms can then offer lower wages to laid off 
workers. There might however be many situations in which firms are 
unable to tell the quality of an applicant or in which firms only receive 
unreliable information about an applicant's employment history. The 
reason might be that quits are difficult to distinguish from lay-offs 
because employers write good reports for someone who they want to get 
rid of. Alternatively in many labour markets job applicants are able to 
lie about their past employment history or are not required to report on 
i t .
This paper develops a matching model in which employers (firms, 
managers) are unable to distinguish workers; they only observe a job 
applicant; they do not observe his or her reason for being in the 
applicant pool. Additional assumptions are that wages are fixed and 
that workers differ in both ability and job enjoyment and that these 
two are uncorrelated. Labour demand will then be a function of the 
perceived quality of applicants and of the number of workers who quit 
and where fired. Workers when deciding to quit take account of their 
chances to be re-employed. This interconnection of hiring and quitting 
decisions can have interesting consequences. A type of sunspot 
equilibrium (randomisations over perfect foresight path) can occur 
because of quit externalities. However, even if such externalities are 
ignored because quitters have static or lagged expectations 
deterministic cycles can occur. In all of these cases job matches may 
not be optimal and, more interestingly, hiring may not be at its optimum 





























































































These results therefore distinguish this paper from the work of 
Jovanovic [1979] and derivative papers such as Jovanovic [1984] and 
Me Laughlin [1991]. These models imply efficient matches and 
turnover. In the model of this paper quits are always voluntary from a 
worker's point of view. Quits are however not necessarily good from an 
employer's point of view. Equally, lay-offs are often not optimal from 
an employees point of views, but they are always optimal from an 
employers point of view. In' the models of the papers cited above 
matches are dissolved when they become inefficient. In this model 
employers can only lay-off a restricted number of workers, and workers 
can quit whether this is good for employers or not. Quits in this model 
are generally lower than in a model in which workers do not take 
account of their re-employment chances, that is of aggregate hiring.
In Me Laughlin [1991] the quit lay-off distinction arises out of a 
censoring of wage revisions. Initial asymmetries in information create 
private incentives for revising the wage. If a separation results, then the 
side initiating the wage revision determines the turnover label, that is, 
the distinction between quits and lay-offs. Independent of who initiates 
a separation, all separations are efficient. This model departs strongly 
from this way of looking at dissolutions of wage contracts; the primary 
distinction is that this model does assume that ability and job 
enjoyment are uncorrelated and that wages are fixed. As a result quits 
and lay-offs may not be optimal to both sides of a contract and wages 
can not compensate for job dissatisfaction (or job satisfaction).
The reason for the possibility of multiple equilibria in quitting 
decisions in this model is easy to explain: higher quits may cause higher 
hiring based on the rational belief by employers that higher 
unemployment is a signal of a higher average quality of the unemployed. 
More intensive hiring of the unemployed may therefore cause badly 
matched workers to quit who would otherwise not have quit because 
they would have evaluated their chances of finding another job as too 
low. Multiple perfect foresight equilibria therefore may exist due to a 
quit/ quality externality. This result may support a view that the 
unemployed may be ’stigmatised' by firms in the sense that if there are 
fewer unemployed then they might find it harder to get another job. This 




























































































since higher unemployment may be a signal of the fact that there are 
"many good workers in the streets"12, that is of higher turnover.
The point that multiple equilibria might occur due to quitting 
externalities was suggested by Hall [1988] in his discussion of Akerlof, 
Rose and Yellen's [1988] idea that if jobs are rationed then workers 
may stick to jobs they do not like because the chances of finding 
another job are low. It is unsatisfactory that Akerlof, Rose and Yellen 
present this idea within the context of a model in which (involuntary) 
unemployment and reemployment chances (i.e. hiring behaviour) are 
determined exogenously; they are not determined within the model. 
Their analysis also misses the important point, that quits are not 
necessarily a function of unemployment only, but of the probability to 
be re-hired, which depends on unemployment, quits and the perceived 
quality of applicants. This paper (apart from developing a very different 
model to that of Akerlof, Rose and Yellen) goes well beyond Hall's 
suggestion that 'thick market' theory (Diamond [1982]) should be 
applied to quitting decisions. It demonstrates how quitters' beliefs 
about employment opportunities become important within a model in 
which hiring and quitting decisions are interconnected and employment 
opportunities are endogenous to the model. In such a relatively 
complicated context it is shown how such simple constraints as not 
being able to tell an applicant’s quality creates a quit/quality 
externality, thus making the expectations of quitters important. 
Sunspot equilibria (here multiple perfect foresight paths) may as a 
consequence exist.
In the next section the model will be described. Section 3 will 
then analyse hiring demand with respect to various different 
assumptions about the expectations of workers and managers. Section 4 
will comment on several variations of the basic modelling set-up. 
Section 5 will conclude. 12
1For an alternative analysis of the relationship between stigma and quits see for 
example Kirman and Waldmann [1992], Note however that their model is very 
different to the one developed in this paper
2Pissarides [1992] on the other hand shows that multiple equilibria are a 
possibility if workers loose some of their skills during unemployment. The 
mechanism to achieve this result is a thin market externality that reduces the 





























































































This section describes the basic structure of the model. Section 4 
will comments on relaxing some of the central assumptions.
2.1: Structural assumptions
•The time structure of the model is as follows: At the beginning of each 
period workers can quit their job, and they can be fired by employers. 
At the beginning of a period, after observing the level of transitory 
unemployment3 T, employers hire from the unemployment pool. It is be 
assumed that employers can only hire form the (transitory) 
unemployment pool. In reality, a significant number of job switches are 
of course not via the unemployment pool, but directly from job to job4, 
but this is not what will be modelled.
It —Kjuit and fire-» Tt —> hire —> production -»  lt+1
lt+l —> quit and fire-»Tt+l —* hire —> production
3 T is an observable, public variable. A transitorily unemployed worker is someone 
who quit, was fired, was unable to get a job the period before or is a young worker 
entering the job market. Transitory unemployment is therefore the pool of workers 
who are looking/ applying for a job and who do not have another job. A transitorily 
unemployed worker need however not be unemployed during any production period 
since s/he may be hired as soon as s/he enters the unemployment pool T. 
Transitory unemployment is described in more detail in section 2.2 below.
4Akerlof, Rose and Yellen [1988] quote a statistic (page 514, footnote 16) which 
states that in a typical month in 1977 in the USA 3.3 million employed workers 
searched for a job compared with 6.3 million unemployed workers (all o f whom by 
definition looked for work). The statistic is taken form Carl Rosenfeld "The extend 
of job search by employed workers" in the Department of Labour, Special Report 
Force Report 202 (GPO, 1977). They use this statistic to emphasise the 
importance of job to job quits. We interpret this statistic as emphasising the 
importance job switches via unemployment, even if the unemployment spell is 
only short.
The Sozio-Okonomisches panel (a West German panel) as used by 
Winkelmann and Zimmermann [1992] for example shows that about half of job 
switches are job to job (less than one month of unemployment or direct job to job 
changes)
Although both statistics quoted demonstrate the importance of job to job 




























































































In order to make the model tractable let us impose a two period 
overlapping generations structure. Any new generation enters the 
unemployment pool before (transitory) unemployment T is determined5. 
They may then be hired form the unemployment pool Tt. Those of the 
generation starting at t who were hired can at the beginning of period 
t+1 decide whether to quit or not. Quitting and firing decisions are 
taken independently. Those who quit then have to enter the 
unemployment pool which is composed of themselves,those who were 
fired, the new generation entering at t+1 and those who where not 
hired the period before. Before unemployment is determined those 
agents who entered the labour market in period 't-1' retire and those 
entering in period t+1 enter. Let us summarise this information for one 
generation:
It—>Tt —>hire—̂ produce—» lt+1 —>Tt+l—>hire—>produce—> lt+2
—>hired —»produce—> quit(i)/fired(4-) —̂produce—»
gt enters Tt gt retires
-m ot hired—>unemployed—>lt+l —>Tt+i—»hired (ft) or unemployed
• Workers differ in ability and job enjoyment. Job enjoyment is match 
but not worker specific. Ability on the other hand is worker specific but 
not match specific. For simplicity it will be assumed that there are only 
two types: 'high' and 'low' ability workers. It is assumed that ability and 
job enjoyment are uncorrelated, that is, it is assumed that when a 
worker has high ability then s/he is good at all jobs, however s/he 
prefers some jobs to others. Equally, low ability workers are bad at all 
jobs but still prefer some jobs to others. An employer may therefore 
want a worker to stay but the worker does not like his or her job. 
Alternatively a worker may like his or her job but be undesirable. In 
terms of notation:
productivity at all firms job enjoyment at job k for wage w 
worker (i) x; e*
5 The analysis would not change if  one assumed that each period a fixed 





























































































and eik is assumed to be a continuous variable and x,e {0,1}. In terms of 
enjoyment there is therefore a horizontal matching problem. Assume 
furthermore that unemployed workers are perfectly allocated to posted 
vacancies. Agents only get to know their job enjoyment after taking up a 
job. It is always worthwhile for an unemployed worker to take a job and 
for an employed worker to stick to his or her job when not expecting to 
get another one, that is, I assume that for all i and k, w>-ejk, and that 
for an unemployed worker w=0 and eik=0. Unemployment during 
production periods is therefore involuntary. Should there be an excess 
demand of labour then labour is evenly distributed to announced 
vacancies. It will also be assumed that each generation has the same 
number of good and bad workers.
• Information structure: Workers do not know their job enjoyment 
before having worked in a job. Firms when hiring do not know any of the 
private characteristics of a job applicant, that is they neither know the 
age, ability or past job enjoyment of a worker nor do they know whether 
the worker quit or was fired (should s/he have had a job before). Instead 
of saying that employers do not know this information one can also 
assume that they do not want to or are not allowed to base their 
decisions on this information. That employers do not know somebody's 
age is an assumption that does not make much difference (see section 
4). The other assumptions are of importance however6 and do not, as a 
matter of fact, seem that implausible. Firing is often covered up as 
quits by both employer and employee (for various reasons), so that the 
distinction between them may be blurred. Further, a firm’s hiring and 
firing policy is to some extend controlled and constrained by unions. In 
a big labour market it may also be either too costly or simply impossible 
to find out about a worker's past employment history, and it may be 
fairly easy for applicants to claim that they got laid off due to some 
reason unrelated to competence.
• Wages: For simplicity it is assumed that all workers receive the same 
wage w whatever the job or the quality of the worker, and independent
6This assumption is one of the main features which differentiates this paper from 
the asymmetric information literature ((see for example Waldman [1984], 
Greenwald [1986] and Gibbons and Katz [1991]), since in this literature some of 
the private characteristics of a worker such as his or her past wage or job 




























































































of whether there is unemployment or not. Naturally this is a stringent 
assumption. It would seem preferable to pay better workers more than 
worse workers. On the other hand a firm has the incentive to pay 
everybody the same low wage if it can get away with it.
It seems a fair generalisation that in most economies it is 
generally the case that labour demand is lower than labour supply (this 
of course ignores markets in specialised labour). Once one assumes (as 
I do) that firms must pay the same wage rate to everybody (they might 
have to do so because of union pressure) then one can easily explain 
that wages may be rigid downwards in times of unemployment. The 
reason may be that firms only hire applicants at very low wages since 
they have lower ability on average. The employed workforce on average 
has higher ability than the unemployed workforce so that the former 
can threaten to strike should firms try to implement lower wages. In this 
model therefore quality and not hiring and firing restrictions create 
'insider power'. That wages are rigid upwards when labour demand is 
higher than labour supply seems slightly less plausible. One can 
however specify the model so that in Nash equilibrium this case never 
occurs.
• Since I want to concentrate on the hiring decisions of firms the market 
structure will be kept as simple as possible. In terms of assumptions 
this is supposed to mean that workers can apply for any job and have an 
equal chance to fill it; firms take input and output prices as given; there 
is a small number of firms and a large number of workers. The 
assumption of fixed wages is particularly appropriate for the partial 
labour market of low paid jobs. What I have in mind is, for example, the 
market for 'unskilled' labour in Germany, where metal workers can 
become miners, where the wages of metal workers are more or less the 
same as those of miners, and where the price of steel and coal are more 
or less fixed by world markets .
♦Magnitudes: It will be assumed that at any period of time there are 2 
generations of G workers each in the economy (G young workers and G 
old workers). Say that 2G is a measurable interval which is normalised 
to 1 (i.e. 2G=1). Assume a finite7 number F of identical firms who




























































































maximise profits with respect to hiring a proportion of the available 
workers. Firms therefore hire fractions of an interval.
It is slightly counter-intuitive to define profit, technologies and 
costs over proportions of the workforce rather than over the number of 
workers employed. Since it was assumed that the size of the population 
remains constant this makes little difference however.
• Notation: Although the notation will be introduced and defined later 
in the text, here is a quick reference: let rcft be the profit to firm f at 
time t and let lt be the proportion of the total workforce (2G) employed 
at firm f at time t. Let hft be the proportion of workers firm f wants to 
hire at time t and let Qft, rft and Mft be the proportion of the total 
workforce who quit, retired and were fired at firm f at time t 
respectively. Tt denotes the proportion of total workforce (transitorily) 
unemployed (before hiring) at time t. The variable qt denotes the 
probability that any non-retiring employed worker quits.
2.2: When to quit
The only decision workers have to take is whether to quit. At the 
beginning of each period agents who are employed can either quit and 
apply for a new job or stay at the same job as before; they might also be 
fired. Unemployed workers and agents who will retire do not face a 
decision problem. Firms only fire low ability workers. Low ability 
workers face a probability 'pm' of not being fired. Good workers are 
never fired (for them pm=l). The probability of being fired depends thus 
on the type, i.e. pm(x;) (where the type is either a good or a bad worker). 
The job enjoyment level workers can expect in other jobs is the mean 
enjoyment level over all jobs E(ejp). Assume that there are enough 
different jobs so that somebody's present job does not influence the 
mean Ep(eip) (i.e. the number of different jobs is 'large'). The expected 
return of quitting depends on the expected hiring intensity Pt which 
depends on how many workers will quit and on how many of the 
unemployed workers firms hire. Call the probability of being re­
employed for someone in the applicant pool at time t 'Pt' (the hiring 




























































































P, =(Hl/Tl) if Ht<Tt 
= 1 if otherwise
( 1 )
( 1 )
where Ht is aggregate fraction of the total workforce firms want to hire 
(i.e., aggregate hiring demand) and Tt is the 'transitory unemployment' 
rate at time t which is composed of the aggregate fraction of quits (Q,), 
of lay-offs (Mt), of new workers G and of the unemployed from the 
previous period ((l-Pt-i)G):
remembering that G = xh  and taking account of the fact that quitting and 
lay off decisions are taken independently so that one has to subtract 
qtMt from Qt and Mt. Transitory unemployment Tt is thus the fraction of 
workers looking for work in period t after quits, lay-offs and 
retirements occurred and before firms hire. It therefore is the pool of 
workers who are applying for a job and who do not yet have another job. 
Note that a transitorily unemployed worker need not be unemployed 
during any production period since hiring in this model only takes place 
between production periods. The variables Ht, Qt, qt and Mt shall be 
derived below.
Since workers take their quitting decision before unemployment 
is observed and before firms hire, one has to make an assumption on the 
way workers form their expectations. In this paper I shall only consider 
two different beliefs/ expectations assumptions:
Assumption (Static expectations ): Pet=Pn (3)
Assumption (Perfect foresight pel=(Ht/Tt)e= Ht/Tt (4)
With static or lagged expectations workers believe that their 
chances of being re-hired are the same as they were the period before 
(i.e. when they entered the labour market).
For workers to have perfect foresight one requires that they 
forecast both Htand Tt. In section 3.4, below, it will be shown that Tt
Tt = G+ Qt+Mt-qtMt+fl-Pt.iIG 




























































































can be expressed as a function of Ht and Pt-i only so that Pt will be a 
function of Ht and Pt_i. Firms on the other hand will be able to 
determine hiring demand on the basis of quits qt and Pt_i. One then 
needs to solve for a perfect foresight Nash equilibrium in qt and Ht and 
in property 2 it will be shown that such a symmetric Nash equilibrium 
will always exist (for the cases I shall consider).
Firing and quitting decisions are taken independently. Workers 
therefore have to take their quitting decisions uncertain of whether 
they will be fired, which seems plausible. This requires that workers 
take their quitting decision on the basis of whether their expected 
utility from staying at the same job is lower than their expected utility 
from quitting. Now let person i's utility at job k be w+e,k and let EejP be 
the expected job enjoyment to worker i of any job p. Worker i will then 
quit his or her job at firm f if the following inequality holds:
Pet(w+Eejp)>
^  Pm(xi)(w+e;f)+( 1 -pm(xi)(Pet(w+EejP))+( 1 -pm(x j)( 1 -Pet)«0))
Noting that pm(xj)>0 one can then define the following 'quit' function:
qi(eik, Pei) = 1 if [Pet(w+EeiP)-(w+eik)]>0 (5)
= 0 otherwise (5)
It can be seen from equation (5) that one's type does not influence ones 
quitting decision, since job enjoyment and ability are uncorrelated. 
Note furthermore that the specification I adopted implies that all 
workers applying for a job have the same chances of being re-hired, 
independent of whether they have been fired, of whether they were 
unemployed, of whether they quit or of whether they are young workers 
entering the unemployment pool. This is of course not entirely realistic, 
but simplifies the model tremendously. I shall now assume8 that job
8 This assumption leads to the easiest functional form by far. Economically it is 
not that implausible since it allows that workers like or dislike their jobs and that 
the (dis)utility of work (including the wage) always outweighs the disutility of 
being unemployed. It also implies that nobody would ever quit his or her job when 




























































































enjoyment is distributed uniformly on the interval [-w,+w]. It then 
follows that
Prob(eikSx)=[(x+w)/2w]=<D(x) (6)
so that C>(Pet(w+Eeip)-w)= (([Pel(w+EeiP)-w]+w)/2w)= V2Pte- The 
probability of quitting for any non-retiring and employed worker then 
is.
To see what is going on intuitively note that at the most half of the non­
retiring employed workers can quit, so if Pte=l then qt=1/2. Equally if 
P te=0 then nobody wants to quit, so that qt=0. It follows that 
q :[0 ,l]—»[0,V2].
Now, in this overlapping generations model G=1/2 workers enter 
the working population at the beginning of each period and at any 
period there are only 2G workers in the economy. It must therefore be 
the case that (’/i/Tt-i) of the workers hired per firm (from the applicant 
pool) are young workers, that is that the number of non-retiring 
employed wokers per firm (lft.i-rft-i) equals V2(hft-i/Tt-i). It follows that 
the fraction of workers per firm who quit in period t is
where hft is endogenous to the model and will be solved for in the next 
section.
In the above model workers quit because they dislike their job a 
lot and because they evaluate their chances of being re-hired as high. 
Since it was assumed that a worker's productivity is independent of his 
or her job enjoyment it follows that a worker's quitting decision is 
independent of his or her productivity- this can be seen in equation (5). 
However quitting and firing decisions overlap so that a proportion of the 






























































































2.3: Firing and Hiring
Let us now pin down the firm's decision problem. Firms are identical 
and 'large'. They are managed by well matched and high ability workers 
belonging to the older generation. These workers shall be called 
managers. Managers cannot tell the quality of an applicant, nor can 
they tell his or her entry date into the labour market. They therefore 
only observe an unemployed worker, but not his or her age9, ability or 
job enjoyment. Managers can however tell the quality (but not the job 
enjoyment) of their employed workforce. Firms can fire workers after 
production has occurred and before hiring, on the basis of this 
observation.
Firms have two decisions to take, to hire and to fire. They 
maximise profits which depend on the number of workers employed ltf 
and on their average quality/ability. The number of employed workers ltf 
equals the number of workers newly hired h,f and the workers which 
remain from the previous period remft_i, i.e. those workers who neither 
retired, nor quit nor were fired. The average quality of someone newly 
hired is the same as that of someone in the applicant pool Tt (since 
hiring in this model only goes on from the applicant pool). The average 
quality of those in htf and in remt.if will therefore be denoted by aTt and 
art respectively.
Managers observe the performance of their workers during 
production (or at the end of it) and so can identify their quality (but not 
their job enjoyment). If they could, they would therefore throw out all 
their bad (non-retiring) workers (since the workers with low ability have 
zero productivity). However, this would in general be clearly 
unrealistic10 1; firms often face rather stringent government11 or union
9 This assumption can be relaxed, see section 4.
10 Nonetheless, this case will briefly be discussed in section 4.
11 Emerson [1988] contains a brief review of firing restrictions in Europe, the US 
and Japan. In several European countries such as Germany, Sweden and Italy work 
councils or trade unions have to be consulted before someone is to be dismissed. 
In Germany, if a work council does not consent a dismissal then the dismissed 
worker can resort to the courts. One could imagine that work councils and unions 
are also guided by the number of dismissals brought before it. This would be one 
way of justifying assumption M.
Alternatively, one can interpret this firing restriction as being the 




























































































restrictions which limit the number of workers they can fire. A 
reasonable way to model these restrictions is to assume that firms can 
at the most lay off a fixed proportion of their non-retiring workers (lfn  
-rft-i) each period. I shall thus assume that:
Assumption M Mft<a(lft-i -rfn )  for some fixed, small a  (9)
Since low quality workers are assumed to have zero productivity this 
constraint must always be binding. In this model firing is thus taken to 
be a very different variable to hiring, since only bad workers are fired, 
whereas hiring goes on from a pool of unemployed workers. This 
formulation of firing restrictions (which ignores adjustment costs) is 
briefly discussed in section 4.
Firms then, in effect, only have one decision to take: to hire. 
They therefore maximise:
7lf, =7c(hft; remft.i; aTb art) GO)
subject to: hfte [0; Tr I.Khit)] (11)
In order to solve this maximisation problem firms need to determine 
remfn  aTt and ar,. It is the purpose of the remaining subsections to do 
so.
2.3.1: Determining the size of the Workforce:
When determining their profits firms need to know the size and quality 
of their workforce. Their workforce in any production period is 
composed of two groups of workers, those newly hired (hft) and those 
that remained from the previous period (remft.i), that is those that did 
not quit, nor retire, nor were fired.
The number of non-retiring workers per firm (lft_i -rft.i) is identical 
in this model to the number of young workers hired by the firm in period 
t-1. Since G=*/2 workers enter the working population each period and 
in every period there are only 2G workers in the economy it must be the
is then observed with probability (l-pm) and high ability workers never perform 




























































































case that ( '/2/Tt-i) of the workers hired per firm are young workers 
(since hiring only goes on from the applicant pool Tt_i). The number of 
non-retiring wokers per firm (lft-i-rft_i) thus equals '^ (W n/T n). The 
number of workers remaining from the previous period is then:
remft. i =lft-1 - rft. i - Qfr  Mft+qiMft
=1/2(hft-i/rt.i) -V2qt(hft-1/Tt-1)-V2Ct( 1 -qt)(hft. 1/Tl.i)
=V2( 1 -qt)( 1 -oc)(hft- i/Tt-1) (1 2 )
where the second line follows directly from the definitions of (lft_i-rfn); 
Qft and Mft.
Most cases that will be analysed below will assume that a 
symmetric Nash equilibrium was played in period t-1, i.e. all firms took 
identical hiring decisions in period t-1. In this case the fraction of non­
retiring workers is identical to (in this two period overlapping 
generations framework) the hiring intensity (or probability of a worker 
in Tt_i being hired) times the population entering the labour force in 
period t-1 which equals a half, i.e.
(lfl-i-rft-i)=1/2(hft-i/Tt-i)=1/2(Pt-i/F) (13)
where F is the number of firms.
2.3.2: Quality
All employed workers took their quitting decisions independent of their 
type; Qft= I/2qt(Pte)(hft-x/Tt-i) nevertheless is a biased sample since 
firing and quitting decisions overlap (i.e. they are taken independently). 
Note however that one can also consider V2qi(Pie)(hft-i/Tt-i) an unbiased 
sample and assume that effective firing only amounted to
Mft^ M ft-Mftqt=V2(l-qt)a(hft.,Art.i) (14)
bad workers fired (i.e. those that did not quit as well). The non-retireing 
workers have average ability of a half, quitters have average ability and 
those effectively fired have zero ability. Given this way of looking at 
layoffs it is easy to determine the average quality of those hired and of 




























































































The average quality of the workers in remft.i (those who neither 
quit, nor were layed off, nor retired) equals the proportion of good 
workers in remft_i (w.r.t. 2G) divided by the proportion of workers in 
remft-i (w.r.t. 2G). Recall that the productivity xj of low and high ability 
workers is 0 and 1 respectively and that the population consists of an 
equal number of good and bad workers. Half of those workers who 
remained from last period and were not effectively layed off, have high 
ability (i.e. half of (1 -qt)(hft-i/Tt-1) have zero productivity). It then 
follows that the average ability of someone remaining from the previous 
period equals:
ah =[(V2)(V2)( 1 -qt)(hft.i/Tt-1)]/[ V2( 1 - q.Xl-aXhh-iAV,)]
=V2(l/(l-a)) (15)
which is constant and art=are (V2.I) if cce (OX/2), which should be the 
case.
The average ability of those newly hired is equally easy to define. 
It equals the proportion of good workers in Tt (w.r.t. 2G) divided by the 
proportion of workers in Tt (w.r.t. 2G). Now, note that the ability of the 
workers in M*t is zero and that half of those in (T-Mt*) must be of high 
ability and the other half of low ability. The reason is that (T-Mt*) 
equals (l+Qt+V2Pt-i)> all of which have average ability. The average 
ability 'aTt' of those in Tt (that is of those newly hired) then is:
aTt= aT(T„ qt,PM)=[0-Mt* + l-»/2 *(T-M,*) +0*V2 (T-Mt*)]/T
=V2 -V2 (MtVTt)
= lh  -*/2 ((V2(l-q.)aPt-iVTt) (16)
One can therefore see that the average ability of someone in remfn  is 
always higher than that of someone in Tt. Firms therefore prefer few 




























































































3. Hiring Quality Labour
In this section I shall discuss the dynamics of hiring demand with 
respect to different assumptions about how far sighted managers and 
workers are. Section 3.1 proves that if workers have static expectations 
then the quality of the unemployed is a function of the past hiring 
intensity Pt_i only and that the quality of the unemployed is decreasing 
in Pt. Sections 3.2 and 3.3 contain examples in which managers are 
'myopic' and 'far sighted' respectively and in which workers have static 
expectations. In section 3.2 it will be shown that in the simple situation 
in which firms are myopic and workers have lagged expectations hiring 
can proceed along a deterministic cycle. Section 3.3 discusses some of 
the problems that arise once managers are more 'far sighted'. Section 
3.4 proves that if workers have perfect foresight and if managers are 
'myopic' then a symmetric perfect foresight equilibrium always exists. 
Section 3.5 will give an example of this case and demonstrate the 
possibility of multiple perfect foresight equilibria. In all sections, 
except section 3.3, I will only consider symmetric Nash equilibria (that 
is, I will assume that (hfl_i/Tt_i)= (Pt_j/F)).
3.1: Workers with static expectations
The case in which workers have static expectations (Pte=Pt-i) is fairly 
easy to analyse as will be shown in this section. In sections 3.2 and 3.3 
examples will then be given which will illustrate the consequences of 
static expectations by workers.
Property 1: Assume that a symmetric equilibrium was played in period 
t-1 and that workers have static expectations, then:
a) Pt.] alone determines the average quality of the unemployed in 
Tt, and 3Tt/3Pt.i<0 for P ^ e  (0,1).
b) The quality of the unemployed is a decreasing function of Pt_i.
Proof: a) The transitory unemployment rate was defined in equation 2: 
Tt = 1+ Qt+Mt-q[Mr  V2P t-i 
= l-1/2(l-a)(l-qt)Pt-i
Static expectations of workers (Pte=Pt.i)imply that qt=1/2Pt-i so 
that Tt= l-y 2(l-<x)(l-1/2Pt.1)Pi.i = T(Pt.1) (PI)




























































































9T|/9Pn=-V2( 1 -a)( 1 -Pt-i)<0. 
b)The average ability of those in the applicant pool Tt is 
aT(Tt, q„Pt.i)=V2 -V2 ((V2(l- qt)aPt-i)/Tt)
Part (a) of the proof implies that Tt= T (P t-i) and static 
expectations imply that qt=1/2Pt-i- It follows that the ability of 
the unemployed
aT(Tt, qt,P,.,)=a( T(q(Pt.i),P,-i), q(P,-i),Pt-i) = aT*(P,-i) (P2) 
is a function of the the past hiring intensity Pt-i only. Now
OaTvaPt-i)=-1/2[1/2a(l-P[.i)Tl - i^d-qJaPnOTt/aPn)] 
so that aT*'(Pn)<0 for PMe (0,1). Q.E.D.
Observe that the maximisation problem of firms becomes much 
simpler in the case in which the expectations of workers are static and a 
symmetric Nash equilibrium was played in period t-1. In section 2.3.2 it 
was shown that the quality of the employed (remft-i) is constant and in 
property 1 it was shown that the quality of those in Tt is a function of Pt_ 
i only, i.e. Tt=T(Pt.i). Note furthermore that remft.i=(l-Tt)/F. It follows 
that the quality of those employed (remft.i and hft), is determined by Pt.i 
and hft only. The two variables which determine profit in the case in 
which workers have static expectations are therefore hft and Pt-i, i.e.
7tft =Ji(hf,; remft.i;aTi, ah)
=7t(hfi; (l-T(Pt.!))/F; aT*(Pt.,), ah)
=7t*(hft; Pt.,) (17)
subject to: h^e [0; T(Pt.,)-X.f(hjt)] (18)
where T(Pt.i) and aT*(Pt-i) were defined in equation (PI) and (P2) 
above.
3.2 ...who are hired by 'myopic' managers
Consider the bench-mark case in which managers are 'myopic'. 'Myopic' 
managers maximise one period decision problems.They therefore hire 
without taking into account the effect their hiring decisions have on 
future demand and quality. Managers therefore do not care about 





























































































Consider the following profit function :
7tt =(remfl.iar+aTthft)Y-w(remft.i+hft) (19)
which equals
Jti =(V4 (1 -qt)Pt-t/F+a^CP,.,)hft)T-w(remft.i+hf0 (19')
given the definitions of Tl; remfn  aT\  and art and the assumption that a 
symmetric equilibrium was played in period t-1. In order to understand 
the expression [ '/4 (1 -qi)Pt-i/F] in economic terms note that the 
fraction of non retiring workers hired per firm (if a symmetric 
equilibrium was played the period before) is V^Pt-i/F- Half of these are 
of high ability and q( of these are expected to quit.
Constant returns:
The unconstrained first order condition in the case of constant returns 
to average efficiency labour units (set y=l in equation (19')) is
0jc(.)/3hft= aT*(Pn) - w (20)
In the case in which every firm wants to hire the maximum amount 
possible labour is allocated symmetrically. A feasible symmetric Nash 
equilibrium then consists in hiring Tt/F in the case of aT(Pt_i) > w, i.e.:
= T^F if aT*(Pt_1) > w
h*(Pt-i) e [0.T./F] if aT*(Pt_i) = w (21)
= 0 if aT*(Pt_i) < w
Since aT*'(Pt.i)<0 one can re-express the constraint aT*(Pt-i)=w in 
terms of a function Pt.i = p(w). The solution in equation (21) can be 
rewritten as follows
= 1 if if Pt_i < p(w)
Pt e [0,1] ifPt., = p(w) (21)




























































































The graphical solution of constant returns to scale is depicted in figure 
1 below. As can be seen there is one solution in which the hiring 
intensity Pt will be constant and and another solution in which the 
hiring intensity cycles between 0 and one. Which of the two solutions 
will prevail depends on both initial values and to which solution hiring 
intensity will tend. In the case of constant returns to scale, unless the 
case of aT*(Pt-i)= w occurs, hiring intensity will cycle between zero 
and one.
0 Pt-i 1 Figure I
Intuitively cycles occur because firms hire all workers when 
unemployment is high; this leads to lower quality of the unemployed the 
following period (property 1) because firms can fire many workers and 
no un-hired workers remain (and this even though quits will be high due 
to static expectations). It follows that that firms hire fewer workers in 
the following period.
Decreasing returns :
The unconstrained hiring function for decreasing returns is given by
htf=[w/Y]l/(TH) [l/aT*t]Y/(Y-l) -1/4(1-qt)Pt-l/FaT*t (22)





























































































= TVF if hft> Ti/F
h*t = hf, ifh ft e [0,Tt/F] (23)
= 0 if hfi< 0
It can easily be verified that hft is a decreasing function of Pt-i. As above 
one can then re-express the solution in terms of a function p(Pt-i). I.e.
= 1 if if Pn < h-i(T[/F)
P, e [FhCPt-O/T,] if P,-t = h-'(Tt/F) (24)
= 0 if P,_i > h-!(T|/F)
The graph of this solution is depicted in figure 2 below. Again the 
results are similar to the case of constant returns to scale. If managers 
and workers behave as depicted in this section then hiring demand is 
either constant or cycles. However, in the case of decreasing returns 
other, smaller cycles in hiring intensity can also occur, depending on the 
curvature of the function hfi(Pt_i).
Figure 2
♦ Wages
Let me briefly comment on the effect of higher wages on labour demand 
(two economies are compared which are equal in all aspects apart form 
the wage rate). In both cases, constant and decreasing returns, it is 
easy to observe the effects of lower wages: for lower wages (w"<w) iso­
profit curves shift up and to the right, that is labour demand increases 
for every Pt_i. As a consequence the feasibility constraint T becomes 




























































































the unemployed. It also follows that the stationary solution of lower 
wages implies a higher hiring intensity.
3.3: ...who are hired by 'far sighted' managers
This section shall have another look at the consequences of static 
expectations of workers, but this time managers maximise a two period 
problem. Managers analyse the constant returns to scale technology of 
section 3.2 (i.e. equation (19') with y=l). The interpretation of the two 
period case is as follows: the best matched workers with high quality 
become managers after one period. They then determine hiring for their 
second life time, but also care about the period after they retire (i.e. 
their retirement period). Beyond this period they do not care. Managers 
are therefore 'far sighted' in the sense that when deciding to hire they 
take into account the effect this has on the firm once they are already 
retired. This two period problem brings out all the dynamic elements of 
the model (and the problems associated with them).
This small extensions makes the analysis a lot more complicated, 
however. The complication arises because once one lets managers 
choose their maximising hiring rate one needs to give up the symmetry 
assumption in the profit function for t+1 (since one first needs to show 
that in such a situation a perfect foresight symmetric Nash equilibrium 
exists. The model therefore looses much of its simplicity. In order to 
keep the problem 'manageable', I will therefore assume that managers 
only consider the direct effect of their hiring decision on company profit 
(that is, I will assume that managers set [9P(/3hft]=0). Managers 
maximise the following objective function with respect to hft and hfl+i:
7t*(hft; Pt-i)+p7c(hft+i; remft;aTt+i, a1))
= ( 1/4 (l-qt)Pt-i/F+aT*(Pt-i)hft)-w(remft-i+hft) +
+ p(i/4(l-qt+i)hf/rt+aTt+1hft+1-w(V2(l-q.+i)(l-a)hfl/Tl+hft+,))(25)
subject to the standard constraint in equation (11) for t and t+1.
Note that second period decision making (the maximisation 




























































































that a symmetric Nash equilibrium is played in the first period). The 
analysis of myopic decision making also applies to first period decision 
making (the maximisation problem w.r.t. hf[) in the special case in which 
P=0. By continuity one can therefore look at the myopic case as a 
bench-mark case for small Ps. First period decision making is a lot more 
complex than second period decision making because managers now 
also need to consider the consequences of their hiring behaviour on 
future profit.
Maximising this two period profit function with respect to hft one 




having set [3Pt/9hft] equals to zero. In order to understand the 
economics behind 'k' note that (V(2Tt)) is the proportion of non retiring 
workers; of these half will have high ability and qt+i of them are 
expected to quit. Beyond this there is a wage gain which is due to the 
fraction a  of the non-retireing workers who will be fired (taking account 
of the fact that quits and lay offs may overlap since they are decided 
simultaneously). A symmetric and feasible Nash equilibrium would look 
as follows:
= Tt/F if a(Pt.i)-w+Pk > 0 
htf* e [0,Tt/F] ifa(P,.i)-w+pk = 0 (28)
= 0 if a(Pt.i)-w+pk < 0
One now needs to show that a perfect foresight symmetric Nash 
equilibrium exists. In this regard note that Tt is a function of Pt_i only 
because of Property 1 and qt+i is a function of Pt because it was 
assumed that workers have static expectations. Hence k is a 
correspondence of Pt and Pt_i only. Note that optimal and feasible htf 
(i.e htf*) is therefore a function of expected Pt (i.e.Pte) and Pt_i only. I.e. 
htf*=h*(Pte, Pt-i). Now sum over the htf* and divide by Tt (which again is 
a function of Pt_i). One therefore obtains a convex valued upper hemi 




























































































intervals P:[0,l]xPt.!^ [0 ,l]  and this for every Pt_i. P(.) is a convex 
valued correspondence because h(.) is a convex valued correspondence, 
because Tt is continuous in Pt.j and because Tt is bounded below by 
1/2(l+a)>0. Hence for every Pt_ie[0,l] one can invoke the Kakutani 
fixed point theorem12 which implies that there exists a fixed point 
Pt=(Pt)e. A perfect foresight symmetric Nash equilibrium thus always 
exists.
Beyond existence of equilibrium one would of course also like to 
characterise equilibrium and know how it differs from 'myopic' decision 
making. If hiring occurs at all then k is always positive. This implies that 
'far sighted’ managers hire more workers than 'myopic' managers. This is 
fairly obvious. The chance of multiple perfect foresight path seems 
remote however since k is decreasing in Pt. This implies that the more 
mangers expect others to hire the less they hire themselves, and vice 
versa. This occurs because more intensive hiring of other managers 
encourages workers to quit (since they have lagged expectations), thus 
reducing the individual return to hiring.
3.4 Workers with perfect foresight who are hired by 'myopic' 
managers
This section contains a proof that equilibrium always exists when 
workers have perfect foresight and when managers are 'myopic'. 
'Myopic' managers solve the one period maximisation problem of 
equations (10) and (11). As is to be expected the results for the case of 
perfect foresight of workers are much weaker and a lot less straight 
forward than that in which workers have static expectations. However 
perfect foresight also yields more interesting results (e.g., multiple 
perfect foresight path as will be demonstrated in section 3.5). Note that 
the proof below of the existence of a symmetric perfect foresight 
equilibrium equilibrium only applies to the case in which firms 
maximise one period problems (managers are myopic).
12 In Border [1985, p. 72] Kakutani's theorem is stated as follows: Let K be a 
compact and convex subset of Rm and let y be closed or upper hemi-continuous 





























































































Property 2: Assume that workers have perfect foresight of workers and 
that managers are 'myopic' and maximise profit functions which 
are concave in htf. Then, when assuming that a symmetric 
equilibrium was played in period t-1, there always exists a 
perfect foresight equilibrium such that Pt=(Pt)e •
Proof: 'Myopic' managers maximise a profit function 7tft=7c(hft; remft_i; 
aTt, ah) subject to hfte [0; Tr X-f(hJt)].Given the assumption that a 
symmetric equilibrium was played in period t-1 and because of 
eq. 15 the profit function simplifies to 7t(hft, (1-Tt)/F, aTt, const.). 
One can now invoke the theory of the maximum13 which together 
with the assumption that 7t(.) is concave in htf assures that htf is a 
convex valued14 and upper hemi-continuous correspondence of Tt 
and at. By definition (eq. (16)) the quality of applicants is a 
function of the past hiring intensity Pt_i, of quits qt and of Tt. 
Hiring hft is therefore a convex valued correspondence of qt and 
Pi-i; and Tt. i.e. hft=h(q„Tt P,-t) and.h:[0,V2]xTtx[0,l]->[0,Tt] 
Quits, given perfect foresight of workers, take the 
functional form qi=V2Pie- Transitory unemployment equals:
Tt = G+ Qt+Mi-qlMl+(l-Pt.i)G 
=l-V2(l-a )(l-q t)P,-i 
= l->/2(l-a)(l-V 2(Pt)e)Pt-i 
= <t>((Pt)e,Pt-i)
and note that <}>:[0,1 ]x[0,1 ]—»[G(l+a),2G] so that the function 
can never become zero. It follows that 
hft =h(q„Tt Pm )
=h(V2(P)e,<t>((P,)e,Pi-i), Pm )
13See for example Border [1985] theorem 12.1. The theorem says: Let G be a 
subset o f R m and Y be a subset o f R k and let y  be a compact valued 
correspondence from G into Y. Let f be a continuous function of Y into R. Define a 
correspondence (i. from G into Y by g(x)= [ye y(x): y maximises f on y(x)). If y is 
continuous at x, then g is closed and upper-hemi continuous at x and f is 
continuous at x. Furthermore g  is compact-valued.
14 The convex valuedness follows from the assumption that n(.) is concave in htf 
and that the constraint is convex. To see why this is so consider the following 
argument: Let h* maximise Jt(.) at Tt and at. Let hA be another value which 
maximises Jt(.) at Tt and at, i.e. 7t(h*,.)=jt(hA,.). It now follows that any convex 
combination h=th* +(l-t)hA for 0<t<l, is feasible and must also be a maximising 
choice since
7t(th* +(l-t)hA,.)>;t(h*,.) by the concavity of Jt(.) in h .̂ The upper hemi-continuous 




























































































^ ( ( P O s Pm )
and that h*:[0,l]x[0,l ]—>[0,Tt], Now sum over all the hft to get 
H, and then divide by Tt to get Pt, i.e.
Pt =XKh*((P,KPt-i)M((Pt)c,Pt-i)
^ ( ( P ^ P , . , )
Note that P:[0,l]xPn—»[0,1] and this for each Pt_i. Note further 
that P(.) is a a convex valued and upper hemi-continuous 
correspondence because h*(.) and <J)(.) are a convex valued and 
upper hemi-continuous correspondences and because <}>(.) is 
bounded below by V2(l+o0>0. Hence for every Pt.ie [0,1] one 
can invoke the Kakutani fixed point theorem15 which implies that 
there exists a fixed point Pt=(Pt)e. A perfect foresight 
equilibrium thus always exists. QED.
Note that equilibrium need not be unique and, in fact, in the next 
section I shall give an example where multiple perfect foresight 
symmetric Nash equilibria exist.
3.5 Multiple perfect foresight paths in quitting decisions
This section contains an example in which multiple perfect foresight 
equilibria exist due to a quit externality. The intuition driving the 
examples is as follows: if workers expect hiring to be high, then many 
workers might quit because they believe that it will be easy to get 
another job. Higher quits increase the average quality of someone in the 
applicant pool (for any Pt_i) which in turn leads managers to hire more 
workers (given Pt.i) - the belief of workers that hiring would be high 
which induced them to quit was therefore self fulfilling. Equally if 
workers expect hiring to be low then they will not quit because they are 
unlikely to be re-employed. This means that fewer workers will quit 
which will have a negative effect on the average quality of the 
unemployed. Low quality of the unemployed will induce managers to 
hire fewer workers so that the expectations of workers were self- 
fulfilling.
Firms maximise profit with respect to hiring taking (qt,Tt,Pt.i) as 
given (which implies that they also take at as given). In perfect foresight 
equilibrium workers take their quitting decisions, given their




























































































expectation of P, and (Pt)e=Pt. One therefore has to show that the 
expectations of quitters are correct given that firms will maximise 
profit given their quitting decisions. Myopic managers maximise the 
constant returns profit function:
jit=(remft-iart+aTthft)-w(remfi-i+hft) (19)
subject to equation (11) and taking (qt,Tt,Pt-i) as given .
The unconstrained first order condition then is almost as in the previous 
section:
07tt/ahft)= aT(Tt, qt,Pt.i)-w (29)
and Tt= l-1/2(1 -ot)(l-qt)Pt-i assuming that a symmetric equilibrium was 
played in period t-1. Hence the first order condition is only a function of 
qt and Pt-i. Let aT(l-V 2(l-cc)(l-qt)Pi-i, qt,Pt-i) = aTA(q,,P,.i) and note 
that the following parametric assumptions describe various Nash 
equilibrium paths:
aTA(qi=V2, Pt-i=l) = w and Pte=Pt= 1 (30)
aTA(qt=0, Pt-i=l) < w and Pte=Pi=0 (31)
aTA(qt, Pn=0) > w and Pte=Pt= 1 (32)
Assume that at a=w managers hire the highest possible amount (i.e. 
Pt=l). Then the above equations describe a case in which quits may 
make quitting desirable. In order to see this note first of all that 
wherever the economy starts, (Po), the hiring intensity at the next stage 
(Pi) has to be either zero or one. Now if Pt-i=0 then the average quality 
of the workforce at time t must be so high that by assumption hiring will 
be at its maximum (since aTA(qt,Pt-i=0) > w). That is at time t Pt= l. 
Now if Pt. i= 1 then workers can make two perfectly consistent 
forecasts. If they expect Pt=l then they consider their chances to be 
re-employed to be high which means that many workers will quit. This 
will mean that the quality of the average unemployed will be high 
enough for firms to hire the maximum amount they can hire (since by 
assumption aTA(qt=1/2Pt=1/2»Pt-i=l) = w and at a=w managers hire 




























































































bad (they expect Pt=0) then they will not quit. This implies that the 
quality of the unemployed in period t will be so low that manager will 
not hire (since by assumption aTA(qt=0Pt=0,Pn=l) < w).
This example thus described a simple case in which multiple 
perfect foresight path exist due to a quit/ quality externality. That 
there might be multiple equilibria in quitting decisions was suggested by 
Hall [1988] in a different context. The mechanism by which this quit 
externality functions here is an aggregate quality externality which 
may be invoked by the self-enforcing prophecies of workers.
4. Relaxing the Central Assumptions
• All workers have the same productivity
Assume that workers all have the same productivity. Firms, 
according to this model, then have no reason to fire workers, but 
even if they do fire some, all workers in the unemployment pool will 
always have the same productivity. Much of the intricacy in a firm's 
decision problem arises because it wants to keep track of the quality 
of the workers hired and thus of profits. If all workers have the same 
quality then firms will always hire an amount of workers 
corresponding to the difference between their optimal employment 
rate and the number of workers who remain from the previous period. 
Further, the optimal employment rate of each firm should be 
constant in this model, so that, on average, there should be a 
constant average rate of transitory unemployment (due to a 
horizontal matching problem) and a constant average rate of long 
term unemployment, or no long term unemployment at all (due to a 
constant optimal employment rate per firm). Much of the 
complication, but also the interest in the model thus stems from the 
assumption that workers differ in productivity. •
• All bad workers can be fired
If all bad workers could be fired, firms would (in this model) at the 
end of their production period get rid of all their bad workers, since 
they have zero productivity. This would imply that there always is 




























































































average ability of someone in the applicant pool is therefore 
constant if quits are constant. If quits are constant hiring is 
constant. Whether the average amount of quits is reduced by this 
possibility depends on hiring (that is on the profit function). One 
cannot rule out multiple perfect foresight path as in section 3.5. 
(However in order to fully consider this case one would have to 
slightly re-define ability as in the present definition ar tends to 
infinity as a tends to 1)
Firms can distinguish workers bv age.
As a consequence there would be two different hiring markets, that 
of the young and that of the old. As the model is set up it is never 
worth hiring the old before the young. As a consequence firms would 
hire all young workers. Older workers would only be hired if hiring 
demand is positive, given the average ability of the older 
unemployed. In this case quits would be reduced since chances to be 
re-employed would then be much lower. Technically therefore little 
would change if one assumed that firms could distinguish the young 
and the old.
Workers live for more than two periods.
This assumption makes the model a lot easier to work with. There 
would be three major consequences of dropping this assumption: 
first, the unemployment level would no longer be an unambiguous 
signal of of the quality of the unemployed in the simple way it is in 
this model. However, firms could tell the quality of the average 
unemployed via the size of the unemployment pool Tt and via the 
quality of the workforce in Tt_i (which they observed in their 
workforce if Pt-i was positive). The second consequence of dropping 
the two period assumption would be that the maximisation problem 
of employers would become somewhat more complicated, although 
the underlying logic would remain the same. A firm's maximisation 
problem could then be simplified if one assumed that firms can tell 
the age of workers. For each age group there would then be a 
separate unemployment pool as described above. The third 
consequence of dropping this assumption would be that the 
optimisation problem of workers would become a lot more 




























































































be distinguished be age, but even then, the optimisation problem 
would be a lot more complicated than it is in this model. It is exactly 
for this reason that the two period assumption was made.
• Turnover and adjustment costs
In the above model 1 did not assume adjustment or turnover costs. It 
seems however that they could be introduced without too much 
complication. One should however bear in mind that the way firing 
restrictions were modelled in this paper already imposes a 
constraint on firing by firms. However, in many countries there are 
undoubtedly significant costs to dismissing a worker (see Emerson 
[1988]) which underlines the importance of adjustment cost 
considerations16.
• Flexible wages
Wages could have been assumed partially flexible. This would then 
have slightly off-set the excess demand or supply for labour which 
might exist and, more importantly, it would have reduced the effects 
which exist in the model. Partially flexible wages would thus add 
little apart from making the model more complicated. One could also 
have introduced the assumption that workers who do not quit and are 
not thrown out after the first period receive a higher wage. This 
would then have account for the fact that wages increase with tenure 
and would also have reduced the quit rate.
5 Conclusions
This paper analysed the dynamics of an OLG matching model in 
which firms take account of quitting decisions and workers take account 
of hiring behaviour. This leads to the quality of the employed (and 
unemployed) workforce being endogenous to the economy. The driving 
force behind hiring behaviour is that firms do not have any reliable
16 Adjustment costs can be modelled in various ways: quadratic, linear, etc. 
Recent articles by Bentolila and Bertola [1990] and Bertola [1990] argued that 





























































































information about the past employment history of an applicant so that 
their hiring behaviour depends on the expected ability of an applicant.
The model identifies situations in which the (transitory) 
unemployment rate and the hiring intensity of firms is an unambiguous 
signal of the average quality of the unemployed. This feature of the 
model simulates at least two real labour market features: First, that 
employers might under certain conditions be fully rational in believing 
that higher turnover implies a higher average quality of an applicant and 
lower turnover a lower quality. Second, that employers obtain signals 
from the market concerning the average quality of the unemployed.
Quits may be below their 'optimal' level since workers take 
account of their re-employment chances. Quits in this paper depend on 
the expected hiring intensity and are only indirectly related to 
unemployment. Given lagged or static expectations of workers quits are 
negatively related to (transitory) unemployment. In the case in which 
workers have perfect foresight, however, quits may be associated with 
high unemployment (although in this case hiring intensity must also be 
high). One should note that the case just described only describes one 
of the possible equilibrium paths.
The model draws a clear distinction between firing and quits, 
mainly because it was assumed that personal productivity and personal 
job enjoyment are not correlated. This implies that job matches may not 
be efficient, as in the efficient turnover literature. This seems a 
realistic feature of the model.
It was shown (section 3.2 and 3.3) that labour demand may 
proceed along a two period deterministic cycle and that it may be 
stationary. Which of these solutions occur depends on functional forms 
and parametric assumptions. Once one assumes that workers have 
perfect foresight then multiple perfect foresight equilibria in quitting 
decisions may occur (this was shown in section 3.5). The mechanism by 
which quitting decisions may become indeterminate is an aggregate 
quit/ quality externality. The model thus describes a case in which the 
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